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NOTE
A Contractual Dilemma: Where Arbitration
Agreements and Delegation Provisions
Collide
Theroff v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 591 S.W.3d 432 (Mo. 2020) (en banc).
Trent H. Hamoud*

I. INTRODUCTION
Interpretation of arbitration agreements continues to present unique and
challenging issues in Missouri law. Arbitration is a mainstay of the wider
field of alternative dispute resolution, seeking to merge the competing
interests of would-be litigants in a speedier, less expensive, less formalized
environment. Delegation provisions, however, serve as an additional
analytical hurdle in determining when and what disputes can be rightfully sent
to arbitration. At first glance, a seemingly irreconcilable dilemma is
presented. Must assent to the arbitration agreement, and thus the delegation
provision, exist before the dispute will be sent to arbitration? Or is the simple
appearance of a delegation provision, combined with an absence of an explicit
challenge to that same provision, per se sufficient to send the arbitrability
dispute to the arbitrator?
The American Bar Association defines arbitration as “a private process
where disputing parties agree that one or several individuals can make a
decision about the dispute after receiving evidence and hearing arguments.”1
Delegation provisions are separate agreements between parties allowing for
threshold issues of the arbitration agreement, such as whether a particular
*B.S.B.A., Majors in Finance and Mathematics, Washington University in St. Louis,
2017; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law, 2022; Layout
and Design Editor, 2021–2022, Associate Member, 2020–2021, Missouri Law
Review. I would like to thank Professor Thom Lambert, Wall Family Chair in
Corporate Law and Governance, for his insight, guidance, and support in writing this
Note, as well as Jack Gilkey, Note and Comment Editor; Maddie McMillian, Senior
Note & Comment Editor; and the rest of the Missouri Law Review for their help in the
writing and editing process. Finally, I would like to thank my family for their endless
love, support, and encouragement.
1.
Arbitration,
A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute_resolution/resources/DisputeResolutio
nProcesses/arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/MM8E-RZNU] (last visited Oct. 6, 2020).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [], Art. 14

606

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

controversy is included within the agreement, to be decided through
arbitration.2 So widespread is the use of arbitration agreements in American
society that it is estimated more than sixty million American workers are
bound by individual agreements.3 Notably, approximately eighty percent of
the largest companies designate workplace-related disputes for arbitration.4
Part II of this Note summarizes the facts and procedural background of
Theroff’s employment dispute. Part III outlines the legal background relevant
to the Supreme Court of Missouri’s ruling, explaining the common law
evolution of arbitration and providing a brief primer on pertinent contract law
principles. Part IV details the Theroff court’s divided ruling, which ultimately
held that there was neither an agreement to compel arbitration nor assent to
the delegation provision.5 Part V distinguishes related U.S. Supreme Court
cases, while briefly opining on possible implications of the principal opinion’s
reasoning and the enforcement or lack thereof of arbitration agreements and
delegation provisions, more generally.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Theroff v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. arose from an employment dispute.6
Plaintiff Nina Theroff alleged she was constructively discharged by
Defendants Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. (“Dollar Tree”) and store manager Janie
Harper when her request for a reasonable workplace accommodation was
refused.7 Specifically, Theroff wished to allow her service dog to accompany
her.8
After Plaintiff Nina Theroff applied for a job at Dollar Tree, she was
invited to the store for an interview with Assistant Manager Kayla Swift.9 It
was during this interview that Theroff informed Swift she was legally blind
and required the use of various assistive devices.10 Swift then told Theroff
that she was hired and directed her to return to the store a few days later to
complete electronic hiring paperwork.11
One of the documents digitally signed by Theroff, and at issue in the
present case, was a mutual agreement to arbitrate claims.12 Under the mutual
2. Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68–69 (2010).
3. Imre S. Szalai, The Failure of Legal Ethics to Address the Abuses of Forced
Arbitration, 24 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 127, 129 (2018).
4. Id.
5. Theroff v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 591 S.W.3d 432, 440 (Mo. 2020) (en
banc).
6. Id. at 435.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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agreement, it was specified that JAMS employment arbitration rules and
procedures controlled.13 JAMS Rule 11(b) grants the arbitrator the authority
to determine jurisdictional and arbitrability disputes.14
Theroff alleged she only brought a small magnifier with her to the
interview, as she was not told in advance that the hiring paperwork was to be
completed electronically.15 Noticing that use of the magnifier on the
computer screen would take some time, Swift offered to help Theroff
complete the hiring paperwork by taking control of the keyboard and directing
Theroff for certain information, such as her address, phone number, and
account information, unless Swift thought it would be faster for Theroff to
enter the information herself.16 With the entire process lasting approximately
thirty minutes, Theroff maintains that Swift never discussed arbitration,
waiver of a jury trial, or JAMS Rules.17
Swift’s version of events substantially differs from Theroff’s account.
Swift denies that she assisted Theroff in navigating the electronic hiring
paperwork.18 Swift also disputed that Theroff was legally blind or even that
Theroff informed her of her need to use assistive devices because of her visual
impairments.19 Swift stated that she did not electronically sign the mutual
agreement for Theroff, nor field any of Theroff’s questions relating to the
mutual agreement.20 Questioning revealed inconsistencies regarding Swift’s
awareness of facts regarding Theroff’s hiring.21

13. Id. JAMS, formerly “Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services,” is
recognized as a top provider of alternative dispute resolution services in the U.S. and
abroad. Richard Chernick & Robert B. Davidson, JAMS: A Longstanding Provider of
Dispute Resolution Services to the International Business Community, 15 AM. REV.
INT'L ARB. 593, 593 (2004). JAMS Rules are modeled after guiding principles of cost
and time efficiency, prompt communication, and streamlined proceedings. Arno L.
Eisen & Felix Lautenschlager, I Like Jams on My Toast: The Jams International
Arbitration Rules in A Nutshell, 11 VINDOBONA J. 187, 188–89 (2007). As one might
surmise, JAMS Rules are procedural in nature, and “provide that the contract shall be
governed by the ‘rules of law’ agreed upon by the parties.” Id. at 202. If no such
choice of law provision is explicitly provided for by the parties, JAMS Rules “instruct
the Tribunal to apply the law or rules of law which it deems most appropriate.” Id.
14. Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 435.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. (noting that the circuit court did not make any findings).
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After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court overruled the motion to
compel arbitration.22 Both the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western
District and the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court.23 The
highest court held that there existed neither a valid agreement to compel
arbitration, nor assent to the delegation provision.24

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Before close attention is given to the Theroff opinion, a brief background
discussion is first necessary. This Part begins by introducing the Federal
Arbitration Act of 1925 and the Missouri Uniform Arbitration Act, as well as
how these Acts mesh with contracts of adhesion and the unconscionability
defense. Next, key U.S. Supreme Court and Supreme Court of Missouri
decisions in the arbitration space are examined. Finally, this Part concludes
by teeing up the critical topics of delegation provisions and severability.

A. The FAA and UAA
Courts today understand arbitration as a contract matter.25 Therefore,
elementary contract principles such as mutual assent – offer plus acceptance
– and consideration dictate the validity of an arbitration agreement.26 But
what exactly constitutes an arbitration agreement? As noted above, arbitration
is defined as “a private process where disputing parties agree that one or
several individuals can make a decision about the dispute after receiving
evidence and hearing arguments.”27 From this definition, it becomes evident
that assent is a critical component in upholding an arbitration agreement.28
A review of courts’ historical treatment of arbitration agreements sheds
light on the modern jurisprudence. One might find interesting that one of the
earlier high court cases regarding arbitration is a Pennsylvania probate case
from 1791.29 The Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries saw courts refusing
to compel arbitration under the doctrines of ouster and revocability.30 Early
22. Id. at 434–35.
23. Id. at 435.; Theroff v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. WD 80812, 2018 WL
1914851, at *4 (Mo. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2018).
24. Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 440.
25. See Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010).
26. See Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 437.
27. Arbitration, supra note 1 (emphasis added).
28. See Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 437 (citing Green v. Cole, 103 Mo. 70, 15 S.W.
317, 318 (Mo. 1891)) (“It is a well[-]settled principle of law that to constitute a
contract[,] the minds of the parties must assent to the same thing in the same sense.”).
29. Cornogg v. Abraham, 1791 WL 481, at *1 (Pa. 1791).
30. See David Horton, Arbitration About Arbitration, 70 STAN. L. REV. 363, 371
(2018). Here, the doctrines of ouster and revocability are referring to the jurisdiction
of courts to hear disputes otherwise displaced by an arbitration agreement. The
doctrine of ouster provided that “parties cannot ‘oust’ courts’ power to resolve legal
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common law contradictions between contract theory and arbitration are
perhaps best illustrated by courts recoiling at the prospect that more
sophisticated parties could escape judicial oversight altogether if they instead
contracted upfront for resolution of a future dispute by another party arising
from that same contract.31 It was not until the adoption of the Federal
Arbitration Act of 1925 (“FAA”) that arbitration agreements could be
reconciled with more traditional “freedom to contract” principles.32
The FAA can be placed into further context through this economic and
historical lens. Consider Lochner v. New York, the case that would ultimately
lead to the early Twentieth Century period of American jurisprudence known
as the Lochner Era.33 Lochner represented a strong deference by the Supreme
Court to economic due process rights and freedom of contract.34 While
Lochner has long since been overruled and today largely stands as no more
than a relic of a laissez-faire economic past, “many of the arguments made to
claims, and [the doctrine of] revocability condoned a party’s unilateral revocation of
an arbitration agreement.” Amy J. Schmitz, Refreshing Contractual Analysis of ADR
Agreements by Curing Bipolar Avoidance of Modern Common Law, 9 HARV. NEGOT.
L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2004).
31. See Horton, supra note 30, at 377 n.97 (“See, e.g., Kill v. Hollister (1746)
95 Eng. Rep. 532, 532; 1 Wils. K.B. 129, 129 (refusing to dismiss a case concerning
an insurance policy that contained an arbitration provision because ‘the agreement of
the parties cannot oust this [c]ourt’ of jurisdiction); Vynior's Case (1609) 77 Eng. Rep.
597, 599-600; 8 Co. Rep. 81b-82b (voiding an arbitration award made after one party
tried to revoke the arbitration agreement).”).
32. Id. at 377–78. A close study of the legislative history of the FAA establishes
that its “purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by
American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other
contracts.” E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002) (quoting Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991)). Therefore, judicial
enforcement, rather than expediency, was the “overriding goal” of the FAA. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985).
33. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 73–74 (1905), overruled by West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 413–14 (1937) (upholding state minimum wage
law for women as not violative of the Due Process Clause under the Fourteenth
Amendment) (striking down state law setting bakers' hours as it conflicted with the
liberty of contract protected by the Due Process Clause under the Fourteenth
Amendment). The Lochner Era is defined as “[t]he time from 1890 to 1937, in which
the United States Supreme Court, using a broad interpretation of due process that
protected economic rights, tended to strike down economic regulations of working
conditions, wages or hours in favor of laissez-faire economic policy.” Lochner Era,
CORNELL
L.
SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/lochner_era
[https://perma.cc/3DZW-2RT6] (last visited Oct. 7, 2020).
34. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56.
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support a broad application of the [FAA] recall Lochner's libertarian
underpinnings.”35
The FAA, however, does not stand in isolation in Missouri arbitration
law. Missouri’s Uniform Arbitration Act (“UAA”) provides that any written
contract or agreement submitting any controversy between parties is valid,
enforceable, and irrevocable, absent some limited exceptions.36 In practice,
one key difference between the FAA and the UAA is that the latter contains a
conspicuousness requirement, while the former does not.37 While the UAA
will exclusively control for an entirely Missouri-based employer, challenges
may arise in those instances where the FAA supersedes the UAA.38
Therefore, by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the FAA
controls whenever the UAA would otherwise conflict with federal law.39

B. Adhesion Contracts and the Unconscionability Defense
Certain contracts of adhesion can constitute a limited exception under
the UAA.40 An adhesion contract is created by a party with disproportionately
stronger bargaining power, offered by that party to its weaker counterpart on
a “take this or nothing basis.”41 That a contract is one of adhesion, however,
does not necessarily mean under contemporary doctrine that it is one of
unconscionability.42 Resistance by American courts to arbitration agreements
can be closely traced to the evolution of the unconscionability defense in

35. Id.;.Kathryn A. Sabbeth & David C. Vladeck, Contracting (Out) Rights, 36
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 805 n.13 (2009).
36. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 435.350–435.470 (1980).
37. Specifically, under the UAA, an arbitration agreement must be accompanied
by a notice stating: “THIS CONTRACT CONTAINS A BINDING ARBITRAITON
PROVISION WHICH MAY BE ENFORCED BY THE PARTIES.” MO. REV. STAT.
§ 435.460 (1980).
38. See, e.g., Duggan v. Zip Mail Services, Inc., 920 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1996) (holding agreement unenforceable under the UAA due to lack of key
conspicuousness provision, but still enforceable under the FAA).
39. Id.
40. MO. REV. STAT. § 435.350 (1996).
41. Eaton v. CMH Homes, Inc., 461 S.W.3d 426, 438 (Mo. 2015) (en banc)
(quoting Robin v. Blue Cross Hosp. Servs., Inc., 637 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Mo. 1982) (en
banc)). (The terms of an adhesion contract “are imposed upon the weaker party who
has no choice but to conform,” and such terms “unexpectedly or unconscionably limit
the obligations and liability of the drafting party.”) An adhesion contract is not per se
invalid under Missouri law, however. Id.
42. See Susan Landrum, Much Ado About Nothing?: What the Numbers Tell Us
About How State Courts Apply the Unconscionability Doctrine to Arbitration
Agreements, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 769 (2014) (concluding that “[a]lthough a court
may ultimately determine that a contract of adhesion is procedurally unconscionable,
most state courts have held that a contract of adhesion is not per se unconscionable.”).
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contract law.43 Modernly, the two species of the unconscionability defense
are procedural and substantive unconscionability.44
Procedural
unconscionability involves the mechanics of contract formation, whereas
substantive unconscionability involves the actual terms of the contract itself.45
As applied to arbitration, cases asserting substantive unconscionability could
contest the guiding rules, chosen arbitrator(s), and provision for or
disallowance of appeal.46 Procedural unconscionability, however, involves
the mechanics of the formation of the contract.47 Cases challenging an
arbitration agreement on the basis of procedural unconscionability often
allege that the agreement was offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis or
otherwise buried in the fine print of the agreement.48

C. Key Cases
A slew of important U.S. Supreme Court cases helped topple the initial
resistance to arbitration clauses. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corporation, the Court stated that the FAA evinced a
“liberal federal policy [by Congress] favoring arbitration agreements,
notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.”49
43. See David Horton, Unconscionability Wars, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 387, 391–
94 (2012).
44. Robinson v. Title Lenders, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 505, 508 n.2 (Mo. 2012) (en
banc) (quoting State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Mo. 2006)
(en banc)). “[I]t is inaccurate to suggest [in Missouri] that an agreement or provision
must be separately found to be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable to
be invalid.” Eaton v. CMH Homes, Inc., 461 S.W.3d 426, 432–33 (Mo. 2015) (en
banc) (citing Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 492, n.3 (Mo. 2012)
(en banc)). Instead, “[i]t is more accurate to state that a court will look at both the
procedural and substantive aspects of a contract to determine whether, considered
together, they make the agreement or provision in question unconscionable.” Id. at
433.
45. Robinson, 364 S.W.3d at 508 n.2 (quoting State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider,
194 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Mo. 2006) (en banc)) (noting that “[p]rocedural
unconscionability focuses on such things as high pressure sales tactics, unreadable
fine print, or misrepresentation among other unfair issues in the contract formation
process,” whereas “[s]ubstantive unconscionability means an undue harshness in the
contract terms”).
46. See Horton, supra note 43, at 393.
47. Robinson, 364 S.W.3d at 508 n.2 (quoting State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider,
194 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Mo. 2006) (en banc)).
48. See Horton, supra note 43, at 393.
49. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983).
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And in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court held, by a five-to-four
decision, that the FAA superseded a California rule invalidating consumer
contract provisions that require individual arbitration and that waive any right
to bring forth a class action.50
The Circuit City Stores Inc. v. Adams result turned on the decision in
Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson.51 The Allied-Bruce Court
held that the interstate commerce language of the FAA should be assigned a
broad interpretation.52 Concurring in the judgment of the majority, Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor rested on stare decisis considerations.53 O’Connor’s
departure from the majority, however, rested in her belief that the FAA should
not be given such a broad interpretation.54 Still rejecting the view that
Congress intended for the FAA to apply in state courts, as supported by her
prior dissents,55 Justice O’Connor concluded that Congress, rather than the
Court, should expand the scope of the FAA.56 The green light was now
shining bright for the U.S. Supreme Court to extend the FAA to employment
contracts.
It is here that the tensions between state and federal arbitration law start
to become further evident. In Circuit City, again by a five-to-four decision,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the FAA covers employment contracts of
workers unless that class of workers has been specifically exempted from the
FAA, as is the case with seamen and railroad workers.57 In a contested
analysis, the majority applied the maxim ejusdem generis to reach the
conclusion that the FAA specifically excluded only transportation workers.58
The Circuit City Court further concluded that the use of the phrase “affecting
50. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011).
51. Circuit City Stores Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Allied-Bruce
Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
52. Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268
(1995).
53. Id. at 284 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 282 (warning that “[t]he reading of § 2 adopted today will displace
many state statutes carefully calibrated to protect consumers.”).
55. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1987) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting); see also York Int'l v. Alabama Oxygen Co., Inc., 465 U.S. 1016 (1984)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 21–36 (1984)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).
56. Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc., 513 U.S. at 284 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
57. Circuit City Stores Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 124 (2001) (emphasis
added).
58. Id. at 115. Ejusdem generis means “[o]f the same kind, class, or nature.”
Ejusdem Generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910) (noting that “[i]n statutory
construction, the ‘ejusdem generis rule’ is that where general words follow an
enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such
general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as
applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those
specifically mentioned.”).
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commerce” evidenced Congress’s intent to enforce arbitration agreements
under federal law courtesy of the Commerce Clause.59
Finally, a few recent Supreme Court of Missouri cases on arbitration are
worth highlighting. The Supreme Court of Missouri in State ex rel. Newberry
v. Jackson recently unanimously agreed that “[c]ourts should not assume that
the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is ‘clea[r] and
unmistakabl[e]’ evidence that they did so.”60 Eat v. CMH Homes, Inc. states
that a lack of mutuality in an arbitration agreement does not necessarily result
in a nullification of the arbitration agreement.61

D. Delegation Provisions and Severability
The final key background topic necessary to understanding arbitration
clauses involve delegation provisions and severability. A delegation
provision is an agreement to send to arbitration threshold issues relating to the
arbitration agreement.62 In a five-to-four decision, the U.S. Supreme Court
held in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson that a court may hear only those
challenges specifically leveled at a delegation provision.63 However, a
challenge to the agreement as a whole, absent such a specific challenge, could
only be heard by the arbitrator.64
Severability is a fairly straightforward concept. The FAA renders
delegation provisions severable from the rest of the contractual agreement.65
Thus, a court could strike down a delegation provision without invalidating
the rest of the wider contractual agreement.66 Such a judicial manuever has
several important implications. Again, in the employment context, a party
would first need to directly challenge a delegation provision’s validity prior
to a challenge to the remainder of the employment agreement, including the

59. Circuit City Stores Inc., 532 U.S. at 115 (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix
Companies, Inc., 513 U.S. at 277).
60. State ex rel. Newberry v. Jackson, 575 S.W.3d 471, 474–75 (Mo. 2019) (en
banc), abrogated by Theroff v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 591 S.W.3d 432 (Mo. 2020)
(en banc) (quoting First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)).
61. Eaton v. CMH Homes, Inc., 461 S.W.3d 426, 434 (Mo. 2015) (en banc).
62. Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010). Thus, by this
definition, a delegation provision amounts to arbitration about arbitration! See Horton,
supra note 30.
63. Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 72 (2010).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 70 (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440,
445 (2006)).
66. Id. at 70–71 (2010).
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arbitration agreement.67 Consider the significant controlling weight afforded
delegation provisions from Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc.,
where the U.S. Supreme Court held that a court may not rule on the threshold
issue of arbitrability even where the “argument that the arbitration agreement
applies to a particular dispute is wholly groundless.”68 Such a result would
seem to suggest that courts are essentially powerless in addressing threshold
issues of arbitrability, potentially risking far from optimal results. However,
the U.S. Supreme Court provided critical guidance in New Prime v. Oliveira,
holding that a court should first determine whether the “contracts of
employment” exclusion under Section 1 of the FAA applies before ordering
arbitration.69 Indeed, it is only for a contract falling within the scope of the
FAA that a court may exercise the severability principle.70 Thus, New Prime
not only stands for a rejection of an expansive interpretation of the FAA by
the United States Supreme Court, but also a close reading of the entire statute
that rejects viewing any one section in isolation.71

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Theroff, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that there neither existed
a valid agreement to compel arbitration, nor assent to the delegation
provision.72 This Part first examines the principal opinion’s determination of
the existence of an arbitration agreement as well as the controlling weight of
the delegation provision.73 Finally, this Part concludes by briefly examining
the concurring and dissenting opinions.

67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 529 (2019).
“When the parties' contract delegates the arbitrability question to an arbitrator, the
courts must respect the parties' decision as embodied in the contract.” Id. at 528.
69. New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 537 (2019) (emphasis added).
“The parties' private agreement may be crystal clear and require arbitration of every
question under the sun, but that does not necessarily mean the Act authorizes a court
to stay litigation and send the parties to an arbitral forum.” Id. at 537–38.
70. Id. at 538. (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 395, 402 (1967)).
71. See Imre S. Szalai, The Supreme Court's Landmark Decision in New Prime
Inc. v. Oliveira: A Panoptic View of America's Civil Justice System and Arbitration,
68 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 1059, 1072 (2019).
72. Theroff v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 591 S.W.3d 432, 439–40 (Mo. 2020) (en
banc).
73. As a majority of the Judges did not agree on a single opinion, the use of the
term “Principal Opinion” was adopted from the case to refer to that part of the opinion
that provided the underlying rationale for the disposition of the case as a whole.
Plurality opinions are synonymous with principal opinions. James A. Bloom, Plurality
and Precedence: Judicial Reasoning, Lower Courts, and the Meaning of United States
v. Winstar Corp, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1373, 1376 n.16 (2008).
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A. The Principal Opinion
The principal opinion, written by Judge Mary R. Russell, affirmed the
order overruling Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and stay
proceedings.74 The Court found no support necessary to reverse the circuit
court’s order overruling the motion to compel.75 In reviewing the case, the
court first analyzed whether there actually existed a mutual agreement to
arbitrate under Section 435.355.1 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, since this
was a necessary prerequisite to compelling arbitration.76
Theroff disputed that she actually “signed” the agreement because she
did not explicitly authorize Swift to make the operative click.77 Alternatively,
even if Theroff herself clicked the agreement suggesting her consent, Theroff
was not placed on adequate notice of the existence of the agreement – Swift
did not inform Theroff of the agreement and Theroff could not read it because
of her blindness.78 Defendants, however, argued that not only was Theroff
aware of the arbitration agreement and had knowledge of its existence, she
signed it.79
The court reasoned that Theroff’s assertions that she did not see, read,
know of, or assent to the arbitration agreement essentially amounted to a
challenge to the arbitration agreement’s existence.80 Thus, Theroff’s
argument that assent – or a meeting of the minds – did not occur served as a
challenge to the existence of the agreement, itself a prerequisite to compelling
arbitration.81 The court further observed that, by this same reasoning, the
circuit court impliedly found there was no agreement to compel arbitration by
overruling the motion to compel.82 Unfortunately, no express findings of fact

74. Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 439.
75. Id. (citing Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. 1976) (en banc)).
76. Id. at 436.
77. Id. at 436–37.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 437.
80. Id. at 438. The Court made this inference despite Theroff never expressly
citing Mo. Ann. Stat. § 435.355.1 in challenging “the existence of the agreement to
arbitrate.” Id.
81. Id. at 438–39; see also Arrowhead Contracting, Inc. v. M.H. Washington,
LLC, 243 S.W.3d 532, 535 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (“The existence of a contract
necessarily implies there has been a meeting of the minds between the parties.”)
(internal quotations omitted).
82. Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 439.
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or law were provided by the circuit court’s order.83 Deferring to the trial
court’s witness credibility assessment, the court affirmed the lower court’s
order.84
As a final matter, the court addressed the effectiveness of the delegation
provision.85 Whether a contract falls within the coverage of the FAA is a
preliminary inquiry to be applied before applying the FAA’s severability
principle.86 This inquiry results in a separate challenge to the arbitration
agreement, or delegation provision, apart from the overall contract.87 The
court reasoned that because there did not exist an agreement between the
parties to arbitrate, by extension, there could not exist “clear and unmistakable
evidence of the existence of assent to a delegation provision.”88

B. The Concurrence
Judge Patricia Breckenridge concurred in the principal opinion.89 The
concurrence acknowledged that the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court case
of Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,90 quoted in three recent Missouri
cases,91 “were broad enough to imply that the failure of a party to separately
challenge a delegation clause in an arbitration agreement required a court to
sustain a motion to compel arbitration so that formation disputes, including
challenges to the delegation clause, could be decided by the arbitrator.”92

83. Id. However, while the lower court did not make specific findings of fact, it
is worth emphasizing that the plurality nonetheless concluded that the judge must have
necessarily found an absence of assent. Id. at 441.
84. Id. at 439 (noting that “[t]he circuit court could have believed Theroff’s
account that she could not see the screen, was not able to view or read the arbitration
agreement on her own because she did not have the proper assistive device, or did not
know the arbitration agreement was included in the onboarding material through
which Swift verbally guided her … this Court cannot say otherwise.”). It is worth
noting that this ruling does not mean the case is over. The facts of the underlying
claim still have to be decided and fought over.
85. Id. “The delegation provision is an agreement to arbitrate threshold issues
concerning the arbitration agreement.” Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63,
68 (2010).
86. Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 440 (citing New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct.
532, 538 (2019)).
87. Id. (same).
88. Id. (concluding that, “[u]nder these facts, the circuit court cannot delegate
the matter to an arbitrator whose very existence depends upon an agreement.”).
89. Id. (Breckenridge, J., concurring).
90. Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc., 561 U.S. at 68.
91. See State ex rel. Pinkerton v. Fahnestock, 531 S.W.3d 36, 43 (Mo. 2017) (en
banc); see also Soars v. Easter Seals Midwest, 563 S.W.3d 111, 114 (Mo. 2018) (en
banc); State ex rel. Newberry v. Jackson, 575 S.W.3d 471, 474 (Mo. 2019) (en banc).
92. Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 441(Breckenridge, J., concurring).
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However, Rent-A-Center’s holding was recently clarified by the U.S.
Supreme Court in New Prime.93
New Prime held that it is a court’s responsibility to determine whether a
contract lies within Sections 1 and 2 of the FAA before compelling
arbitration.94 This holding means arbitration should only be ordered by the
court where there exists a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce.95 The concurrence reasoned that even in the absence of a party’s
explicit challenge to a delegation provision, the court must still determine
whether the FAA applies and, consequently, its own authority to send the
dispute to arbitration.96 The problem with the dissenting opinions’ reasoning,
as the concurrence sharply notes, “would have the Court put the cart before
the horse” in first determining the appearance of an arbitration provision
without first asking whether a contract even exists.97

C. Judge Powell’s Dissent
Judge W. Brent Powell dissented in the principal opinion, arguing that
the principal opinion represented a departure from previous authority.98 More
specifically, Powell contended that Theroff, by not explicitly challenging the
“existence or validity of the delegation provision,” instead only challenged
the formation of the greater arbitration agreement.99 Because such a formation
dispute amounted to a “threshold [issue] of arbitrability,” the circuit court
lacked authority, mandating reversal of the circuit court’s order.100

D. Judge Fischer’s Dissent
Judge Zel M. Fischer also dissented in the principal opinion.101 Like
Powell’s dissent, Fischer argued that the principal opinion disregarded

93. New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 537–38 (2019).
94. Id. at 537.
95. Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 441 (Breckenridge, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 441–42.
97. Id. at 442.
98. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting). Powell drew distinctions against three Supreme
Court of Missouri cases. See State ex rel. Newberry v. Jackson, 575 S.W.3d 471 (Mo.
2019) (en banc); see also Soars v. Easter Seals Midwest, 563 S.W.3d 111 (Mo. 2018)
(en banc); State ex rel. Pinkerton v. Fahnestock, 531 S.W.3d 36 (Mo. 2017) (en banc).
99. Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 442 (Powell, J., dissenting).
100. Id. (quoting Pinkerton v. Fahnestock, 531 S.W.3d 36, 43 (Mo. 2017) (en
banc)).
101. Id. at 446 (Fischer, J., dissenting).
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previous authority.102 Fischer criticized the principal opinion’s reliance on a
“flawed distinction” between a contract’s “existence” or “conclusion” and its
“formation.”103 Since the issue at hand was whether the arbitration agreement
existed, as Theroff argued that she never assented to it, this was equivalent to
asking whether a contract was actually formed.104 And since the “plain terms”
of the delegation clause assigned “gateway questions of arbitrability,”
including questions over a contract’s formation, to an arbitrator, reversal was
required.105

V. COMMENT
This Part first critiques the principal opinion, concurrence, and two
dissents in Theroff. Next, the societal considerations of the decision are laid
forth. Finally, this Part concludes by returning to the original contractual
dilemma presented at the beginning of this Note.

A. Theroff Takeaways
The principal opinion has taken a pragmatic step towards precedent
regarding the treatment of arbitration and delegation clauses in Theroff.
Theroff raises legitimate concerns about the grounding of the Supreme Court
of Missouri’s decision when compared to U.S. Supreme Court and Missouri
precedent, fundamental contract questions, and other practical concerns.
However, despite these concerns, the principal opinion’s ruling cleanly
resolves Theroff by minimizing the more drastic impacts that could be realized
if the approaches called for in both dissents were instead utilized.
Judge Powell’s dissent raised the concern that Theroff did not
specifically challenge the arbitration provision, but rather the formation of the
greater arbitration agreement.106 And since formation disputes were threshold
issues of arbitrability, Powell argued that the court did not have jurisdiction
to hear them.107 Similarly, Judge Fischer argued that “gateway questions of
arbitrability,” including questions over a contract’s formation, must be sent to
an arbitrator, further rejecting the premise that there existed a difference
between formation and existence.108
102. Id. at 446–47. Fischer drew distinctions against two Supreme Court of
Missouri cases. See generally State ex rel. Newberry v. Jackson, 575 S.W.3d 471 (Mo.
2019) (en banc); see also Soars v. Easter Seals Midwest, 563 S.W.3d 111 (Mo. 2018)
(en banc).
103. Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 446 (Fischer, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 447.
105. Id. (quoting Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68–69 (2010)).
106. Id. at 444 (Powell, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 442 (quoting Pinkerton v. Fahnestock, 531 S.W.3d 36, 43 (Mo. 2017)
(en banc)).
108. Id. at 447 (Fischer, J., dissenting) (quoting Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson,
561 U.S. 63, 68–69 (2010)). Indeed, Judge Fischer concurred with Judge Powell, but
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Both of these arguments are not easily reconciled with New Prime. New
Prime held that it is a court’s responsibility to first determine whether a
contract lies within Sections 1 and 2 of the FAA before compelling
arbitration.109 In other words, a court must find the existence of a valid
contract prior to submitting the parties to arbitration. Further, the Supreme
Court of Missouri recently unanimously agreed that “[c]ourts should not
assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is ‘clea[r]
and unmistakabl[e]’ evidence that they did so.”110 This would suggest that
where, as here, there did not exist “clear and unmistakable evidence of the
existence of assent to a delegation provision,” the dispute clearly cannot be
sent to arbitration.111
Judge Breckenridge’s concurrence succinctly grasps the oft-conflicting
interests at play when a court is to initially consider the applicability of a
delegation clause. On the one hand, Rent-A-Center could be interpreted
broadly such that where a party fails to separately challenge a delegation
clause in an arbitration agreement, the rule should be formation and delegation
provision disputes are to be resolved by the arbitrator.112 But it follows from
New Prime that arbitration should only be ordered by the court where there
exists a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.113 This
becomes a simple logical inquiry when stripped down to its core: was an
arbitration agreement even formed by the parties? If the answer is no, as here,
then it plainly follows that the invalid agreement is not covered by the FAA.
One can follow this one-step inquiry to reach the same result regarding
treatment of the delegation provision under Judge Breckenridge’s framework.

B. Societal Considerations
There still remain outstanding concerns regarding matters of efficiency,
justice, and public policy regarding arbitration agreements and delegation
provisions. Mutuality of obligation in an arbitration agreement seems to touch

only separately dissented to address the “flawed distinction” between “existence” and
“formation.” Id. at 446.
109. New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 538 (2019).
110. State ex rel. Newberry v. Jackson, 575 S.W.3d 471, 474–75 (Mo. 2019) (en
banc), abrogated by Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 432 (quoting First Options of Chi., Inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)).
111. Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 440 (concluding that, “[u]nder these facts, the
circuit court cannot delegate the matter to an arbitrator whose very existence depends
upon an agreement.”).
112. Id. at 441 (Breckenridge, J., concurring).
113. Id.
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all three concerns.114 Consider the situation where an arbitration agreement
between an employer and employee explicitly grants in the employer, but not
the employee, the option to litigate a certain number of issues, rather than
arbitrate them.115 Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Missouri case of Eat v.
CMH Homes, Inc. states that a lack of mutuality in an arbitration agreement
does not necessarily result in a nullification of the arbitration agreement;
rather, it is one factor to consider in deciding whether the agreement is
unconscionable.116 This lack of mutuality suggests that the valid existence of
a delegation provision could turn on the presence or lack of consideration.
Theroff serves as a further illustration of the benefits and detriments that
arbitration agreements present for employers and employees alike. Dollar
Tree’s significant bargaining power as a large, commercial party leaves no
doubt that it is the more sophisticated and knowledgeable drafting party than
the employees on the other side of the bargaining table.117 What is especially
concerning is where, as here, this asymmetry in bargaining power correlates
with an especially disparate impact on disabled employees, like Theroff. This
could extend to concerns for non-English speakers, minorities, and people
with less education or experience with contracts. Additionally, as a private
proceeding between parties, an arbitrator’s decision lacks precedential power
that would be respected by the courts.118 However, arbitration may not best
serve society in this context, as employment law would be further advanced
and respected instead by public adjudication.119
A legitimate efficiency argument also exists in support of arbitration
agreements. Arbitration offers a more informed, timely, economical, and
private resolution of a dispute than if that same dispute was adjudicated in
court.120 Arbitration is often less costly than litigating, due in part to
arbitration’s limited allowance for discovery, less formal structure, and highly
limited scope of judicial review.121 Because of its lower cost structure, some
employees may have a greater incentive to bring forth a claim in arbitration
that they otherwise would not have litigated in court.122 Furthermore,
arbitration benefits the public in that it shifts a pre-defined number of claims
114. See Eaton v. CMH Homes, Inc., 461 S.W.3d 426, 433 (Mo. 2015) (en banc)
(quoting Aden v. Dalton, 341 Mo. 454, 107 S.W.2d 1070, 1073 (Mo. 1937)) (noting
that “[m]utuality of contract means that an obligation rests upon each party to do or
permit to be done something in consideration of the act or promise of the other; that
is, neither party is bound unless both are bound.”).
115. See id. at 434.
116. Id.
117. See E. Gary Spitko, Exempting High-Level Employees and Small
Employers from Legislation Invalidating Predispute Employment Arbitration
Agreements, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 591, 608 (2009).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 605.
121. Id. at 606.
122. Id. at 607.
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that would have otherwise been brought forward in court to the arbitrator’s
purview, therefore freeing-up and reallocating the public’s limited resources
– including courtrooms, judges, and juries – for other claims.123 And if an
employer is subjected to a lesser amount of litigated claims, a standard
economic analysis would seemingly posit that consumers would benefit from
lower prices.124
The approaches advanced by the principal and concurring opinions in
Theroff appropriately balance these competing interests, while maintaining a
fair and predictable outcome for employees and employers alike. The
principal opinion found that assent – or a meeting of the minds – did not occur,
which served as a challenge to the existence of the agreement, itself a
prerequisite to compelling arbitration.125 The principal opinion further
concluded that because there was no agreement between the parties to
arbitrate, there could not be “clear and unmistakable evidence of the existence
of assent to a delegation provision.”126 Along this same line, the concurrence
reasoned that even in the absence of a party’s explicit challenge to a delegation
provision, the court must still determine whether the FAA applies and,
consequently, its own authority to send the dispute to arbitration.127

C. Confronting the Contractual Dilemma
Now armed with the necessary analytical backing, the original dilemma
can be confidently approached. Must assent to the arbitration agreement, and
thus the delegation provision, exist before the dispute will be sent to
arbitration, or is the simple appearance of a delegation provision, combined
with an absence of an explicit challenge to that same provision, per se
sufficient to send the arbitrability dispute to the arbitrator? In answering this
123. Id. at 606.
124. See Stephen J. Ware, The Centrist Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration
Agreements, 23 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 29, 85 (2017). However, “[w]hile [the
assertion that adhesive consumer arbitration agreements result in lower prices for
consumers, especially in highly competitive industries] is the standard economic
analysis, the one study attempting to assess it empirically found no statistically
significant evidence to support it.” Id. at 84.
125. Theroff v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 591 S.W.3d 432, 438–39 (Mo. 2020)
(en banc); see also Arrowhead Contracting, Inc. v. M.H. Washington, LLC, 243
S.W.3d 532, 535 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (“The existence of a contract necessarily implies
there has been a meeting of the minds between the parties.”) (internal quotations
omitted).
126. Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 440 (concluding that, “[u]nder these facts, the
circuit court cannot delegate the matter to an arbitrator whose very existence depends
upon an agreement.”).
127. Id. at 441–42 (Breckenridge, J., concurring).
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question, one cannot help but be reminded that there exists a presumption of
arbitrability for contracts containing an arbitration clause.128 However, this
presumption is flipped when considering the validity of a delegation
provision, or arbitrability about arbitrability.129
Keeping in mind this “reverse presumption,”130 the result reached in
Theroff starts to come into focus. As the concurrence sharply observes, the
approaches taken by the dissents “would have the Court put the cart before
the horse” in first determining the appearance of an arbitration provision
without first asking whether a contract even exists.131 Viewed in this light,
assent to both the arbitration agreement and delegation provision thus
becomes a critical threshold inquiry to establishing not only application of the
FAA, but also the court’s own authority to hear and transfer the dispute to
arbitration, if necessary.132
Theroff illustrates a necessary, baseline level of judicial scrutiny to
delegation provisions and arbitration agreements in a current economic
environment where many Missouri and American workers face significant
bargaining challenges. Notably, while as many as a third of American
workers were unionized in the mid-1950s, today, approximately just 10.5% of
Americans belong to a union.133 Indeed, it is perhaps no coincidence that it is
amongst this backdrop of organized labor’s decline that a new employment
law scheme has emerged across the country.134 The needle must be carefully
thread in deciding whether to settle employment disputes by arbitration or
litigation. This decision requires not only close scrutiny of the actual
agreement between the parties, but consideration of the wider factors
presented above.

VI. CONCLUSION
Under a backdrop of convincing precedent and extensive interpretations
from the U.S. Supreme Court, the principal opinion in Theroff declined to find
the existence of either a valid agreement to compel arbitration or assent to the

128. See AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650
(1986).
129. See Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 79 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944–45
(1995).
130. See Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc., 561 U.S. at 79 (quoting First Options of Chicago,
Inc., 514 U.S. at 945 (1995)).
131. Theroff, 591 S.W.3dat 442 (Breckenridge, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 441–42.
133. Marick Masters, How organized labor can reverse decades of decline,
WAYNE ST. U. (Aug. 2, 2019) https://clas.wayne.edu/news/how-organized-labor-canreverse-decades-of-decline-36673.
134. James Ottavio Castagnera & Michael Ostrowski, Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Employment Law, 57 AM. JUR. TRIALS 255 (1995).
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delegation provision.135 Although the court was substantially divided, the
principal opinion’s findings are not chiefly problematic provided prior
decisions at odds in this area. In short, the plurality’s ruling gives Missouri
courts limited autonomy to make a fact-based inquiry about whether there
even exists a valid contractual agreement before sending the parties to
arbitration. Such a decision could arguably invite more litigation between
parties that dispute threshold issues of arbitrability, such as here, thus
effectively nullifying one of the oft-advanced benefits of arbitration, which is
lower costs. However, what is sacrificed in terms of cost or efficiency is
gained when it comes to protecting the concerns raised by parties with weaker
bargaining power, such as in Theroff. This problem, it would seem, would be
a preliminary matter best left for resolution by the courts.

135. Theroff, 591 S.W.3d at 439–40.
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